GSH reported in early June that Amanda Staveley had made a quiet but deliberate approach to West Ham's ownership structure. The former Newcastle United co-owner wanted to buy an equal share of West Ham, matching Daniel Křetínský. When the Czech owner didn't go for it, everything went quiet. The deal he had agreed to with Vanessa Gold for 16 percent of her family’s shares was getting worked out between lawyers and an official announcement would be made soon. Staveley seemed to go away. The deal didn’t seem right for her. She wasn’t just interested in being the second-largest shareholder if she went in and bought Sullivan’s shares, so it seemed this wasn’t the right fit.
On Saturday afternoon, as West Ham were playing a pre-season friendly against FC Magdeburg, rumors of Staveley’s offer for Gold’s shares were getting louder from the night before, and then they reached a fever pitch. By the end of the 90-minute draw, it was confirmed. Within a couple of hours, Gold made her statement. Staveley essentially offered more money for the Gold family shares and wanted to buy all 25.1 percent.
Staveley and her consortium backed by Ashland Forest Capital Partners, had done their homework on the club's ownership structure, understood the challenges of buying into a multi-shareholder arrangement, and were fully aware that the board had pivoted following David Sullivan's departure under the cloud of serious historic allegations, which he has denied multiple times.
She knew the new direction. She had been told how the board had stabilized around Křetínský as the emerging dominant force, working alongside Karim Virani and Mark Noble, with Nils Koppen brought in as Director of Recruitment and Nuno Espírito Santo retained as manager. The outline of a coherent project was there. West Ham looked, if not entirely settled, at least directionally clear.
Staveley's initial approach was not adversarial. She made contact with Křetínský's camp and proposed coming in as an equal partner. She would match his shareholding, not exceed it. A genuine co-ownership arrangement with two significant investors aligned around the same goal: promotion and a return to the Premier League.
Křetínský said no.
His arrangement with the Gold family, announced in June, would have taken his 27 percent holding to approximately 43 percent, making him the club's single largest shareholder and exceeding Sullivan's 38.8 percent. He had structured the purchase deliberately: enough to be the majority voice without triggering a clause that would have legally required him to either launch a mandatory offer for 100% of the club, or secure a formal "whitewash waiver" approved by an independent vote of the other shareholders. Buying all of Gold’s shares would put him over 50 percent at West Ham. It was, characteristically for Křetínský, an exercise in precision rather than ambition. He had told those around him he was not interested in Sullivan's shares. He was not interested in purchasing all of Gold's shares. He wanted 43 percent, and he wanted it on his terms.
When Staveley's equal-partnership approach was declined, she was encouraged instead to pursue Sullivan's 38.8 percent stake, the largest block in the club, theoretically available at the right price. Sullivan has indicated that he would consider selling when West Ham return to the Premier League. That path existed. Staveley was not coming in to be a minority owner and the uncertainty that came with it. So she changed the game entirely. After being rejected, a source within the ranks of the consortium says Staveley told the group “we’re going for all of it.”
Forcing Křetínský’s Hand
Rather than accepting the terms she had been offered, Staveley went directly to Gold with an offer for the entire 25.1 percent family stake, at a price significantly above what Křetínský had agreed to pay for his 16 percent portion. Her offer is for between £150 and £160 million for the full Gold family holding, a figure that immediately rendered Křetínský's June arrangement with Gold commercially obsolete.
Vanessa Gold, in her statement, acknowledged exactly what had happened: "On 12 June, Daniel Křetínský and I agreed a sale that would have made EP Group the single largest shareholder in West Ham. Unfortunately, since that time, the original deal and other alternatives that we have discussed could not be brought to fruition."
“Other alternatives that we have discussed" is the six weeks of failed renegotiation between Gold and Křetínský compressed into a single sentence. Staveley had driven up the per-share price of the Gold family stake. Křetínský, having agreed to pay a lower price for a smaller portion, was now being asked to match a materially higher valuation for shares he had already structured his plans around acquiring cheaply. The conversation could not be brought to fruition because the terms had fundamentally changed.
His response, issued through a spokesperson, was a statement of barely concealed fury: "The agreement we had reached with the Gold family in June provided stability for the club at a crucial time. Today's announcement does the opposite. We will always act in the best interests of West Ham United and are reviewing all of our options, including exercising our pre-emption rights in full."
The anger is understandable. But Staveley had played entirely within the rules. She made a higher offer to a willing seller. That is not a hostile act in any legal sense. It is, however, a chess move of considerable sophistication and it has left Křetínský in a position he’s never been in at West Ham: reactive rather than deliberate.
Betting against the Boardroom
Those close to Staveley say she went into this with her eyes fully open to what comes next. She knows that Křetínský holds pre-emption rights. She knows he has 30 days to decide how many, if any, of the Gold shares he will purchase at the higher per-share price she has established. She knows that Tripp Smith's 8 percent stake also carries pre-emption rights in the first round.
Her bet? None of them will want to pay more per share than she has offered.
The pre-emption process runs in two rounds. Existing shareholders first purchase their proportional allocation, and any remaining shares are then offered in a second round. Staveley's calculation is that Křetínský, having already said he doesn’t wish to be a majority owner and having previously structured his purchase to avoid exactly that outcome, will not spend significantly more per share than he originally planned just to maintain a position he never intended to expand.
If Křetínský exercises any pre-emption rights, those close to the situation believe he will purchase only enough shares to maintain his positional advantage and enough to ensure that even if Staveley acquires Sullivan's 38.8 percent, Křetínský remains the largest single shareholder. No more, no less. A defensive move rather than an aggressive one. Entirely consistent with how he has operated at West Ham since 2021.
Should Křetínský exercise his pre-emption rights in full and take his holding to approximately 52.1 per cent, concerns have been raised about UEFA multi-club ownership rules given his interest in Sparta Prague. But those concerns are overstated. UEFA's regulations only intervene when two clubs under the same owner qualify for the same European competition in the same season. West Ham are a Championship club. The rules do not apply.
The real constraint on Křetínský is not UEFA. If Křetínský moves to exercise his pre-emption rights to intercept the Gold family's 25.1% stake, he will either have to commit to launching a full takeover bid for the entire club or ensure the remaining board members grant him a formal waiver to safely absorb those shares. Staveley knows this. She has used his own structural preferences against him.
Coming for all of it
Staveley brokered the deal which allowed a Saudi-backed consortium to buy out Mike Ashley at Newcastle in 2021, and she and her husband Mehrdad Ghodoussi oversaw the club's transformation from Premier League relegation candidates to Champions League participants. She did not come to West Ham for a minority stake and a seat at a complicated table. She came because she sees the same thing at the London Stadium that she saw at St James' Park in 2021: an underperforming asset with enormous potential, a fanbase of extraordinary loyalty, and an ownership structure ripe for restructuring.
The Gold stake is the entry point. Sullivan's 38.8 percent is the endgame. Sources indicate that Staveley's masterplan involves pursuing Sullivan's shares as soon as he is open to selling, a scenario he has linked to West Ham's return to the Premier League. Combined with the Gold stake, that would give Staveley's consortium a controlling interest that no other current shareholder could match.
If all this works to Staveley’s favor, then Křetínský becomes a significant but minority voice. The Czech Sphinx, who spent four years accumulating influence without committing to leadership, would find himself outmanoeuvred by a woman he declined to partner with in June. The next 30 days will tell us whether Křetínský understands that is what is happening and whether he has the appetite to stop it.
The Championship season starts in less than 2 weeks. West Ham start their hopeful run at the Carabao Cup this Saturday. And while the boardroom plays chess, Nuno is trying to build a promotion-winning squad with a transfer window that closes in 29 days.
Let's hope the boardroom truly do have the club’s best intentions.
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